Iran Conflict: Netanyahu Gains Strategic Flexibility as Israeli Coalition Talks Stagnate

Benjamin Netanyahu faces a critical window before November 3 when US midterm elections conclude, potentially allowing Israel to resume military operations against Iran. Israeli election results confirmed that Netanyahu’s bloc remains in the minority, leaving no viable path to form a stable government without a deal with Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot. This political impasse grants the prime minister greater latitude to act militarily than a unified government would.

In recent weeks, Netanyahu seriously considered renewing the conflict with Tehran. His hesitation stemmed from opposition by President Donald Trump and Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir. Trump preferred to wait until after the US midterms to avoid distracting from his campaign, while Zamir opposed an attack before the Israeli vote to prevent complications from potential Iranian counterstrikes.

Eisenkot’s camp has not yet begun serious coalition talks. Avigdor Liberman, leader of the Yisrael Beytenu party and an Eisenkot ally, will not start negotiations until Friday when final vote counts are certified. Liberman must then decide whether to partner with Israeli-Arab parties, cut a deal with Netanyahu, or trigger a second round of elections. Complex negotiations over ministry allocations and policy platforms typically take weeks or months, a timeline that extends well past the November 3 US election date.

Zamir has stated he is prepared to attack Iran if Tehran recovers its threat capabilities too quickly or if the US initiates the war with full offensive and defensive backing. Currently, Zamir does not view Tehran as having approached a substantial nuclear or ballistic missile threat, as previous US-Israeli airstrikes in early and mid-2026 set those programs back by years. Therefore, the primary obstacle to a new strike is not military readiness, but Trump’s political calculations.

Trump has signaled interest in resuming strikes on Iran immediately after the midterms. His top advisers are divided on the strategy. Some believe a few days of conflict could force Iran to loosen its stance, while others argue that Tehran’s refusal to crack since February suggests short bursts of violence will not change their behavior. Advisers also warn that Iran has shown willingness to keep firing after ceasefires, potentially prolonging the conflict beyond Trump’s preferred timeline.

If Trump favors attacking, the timing aligns with Netanyahu’s political interests. A return to war with the Islamic Republic would shift national focus away from coalition negotiations and the contentious issues of the October 7 war and religious service in the IDF. This dynamic could make it harder for Eisenkot and his allies to finalize a deal with Israeli-Arab parties while missiles rain down, or push them toward a partnership with Netanyahu to present a united front.

Netanyahu must justify a third round of conflict with concrete evidence of Iranian progress, as he previously claimed to have removed the nuclear and missile threats. Explaining the necessity of a new attack during coalition talks will be central to its legitimacy among the Israeli public. The decision now rests largely on whether Trump chooses to leverage his post-midterm freedom to strike, or continues his pattern of alternating between economic pressure and military threats.